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Abstract
This study investigates the long-run effects of the civil war in Sierra Leone
on education. Similar to the literature in other contexts, I exploit cohort and
conflict variation within Sierra Leone from micro-level data in the spirit of a
difference-in-difference (DID) design. Since schooling typically takes place at
a particular age for people, using school age cohorts in such a way is a very
natural method to estimate a plausibly causal effect of higher conflict intensity
on the education of those affected by it. I find that a one standard deviation
increase in conflict intensity led to a 0.3-0.5 year reduction in the amount of
schooling for school aged children during the war by 2011, that is, ten years
after the civil war ended. Some suggestive evidence on channels indicates that
a major driver of this effect may be supply side factors.
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1. Introduction
Conflict has undoubtedly extremely destructive consequences on various life outcomes
for the people affected by it, at least in the short run. In particular when we consider
per capita measures of economic performance which may arguably reflect living stan-
dards, many studies demonstrate this relationship. Earlier cross-country macro studies
(including Alesina & Perotti (1996); Barro (1991); Collier (1999)) show a clear negative
link between conflict and economic performance and direct cost estimations (Ali (2013);
Arunatilake et al. (2001) as well as more recent micro-empricial studies (such as Lopez
& Wodon (2005); Serneels & Verpoorten (2015)) suggest that there is a negative causal
effect as well. To what extent such effects are persistent in the long run or there is con-
vergence in line with the logic of the Solow model is less clear though. Studies carrying
out research to this end do not deliver conclusive evidence. While some estimates suggest
convergence, others find the opposite. In particular, some direct evidence on GDP (Chen
et al., 2008; Gates et al., 2012; Miguel & Roland, 2011) and city size (Brakman et al.,
2004; Davis & Weinstein, 2002) hints at convergence. By contrast, other direct evidence
on GDP (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Galdo, 2013; Islam et al., 2016) and a range of studies
on education and health outcomes1 that should affect economic performance according
to standard theory suggests that there is no convergence. I contribute to literature on
education outcomes in the long run with evidence from Sierra Leone which suffered an
atrocious civil war between 1991 and 2001.
Beyond having likely implications for living standards in the long run, educational
attainment may also be an outcome of interest in and of itself. In theory, several channels
are conceivable how conflict affects education. On the demand side, reduced financial
resources may lead to lower (consumption of) education through an income channel.2 In
addition, in particular in settings where schools are distant, the cost of education increases
through the destruction of infrastructure and increased uncertainty and insecurity when
leaving the house to attend public institutions. Displacement may be another leading
reason for loss of education. Destinations may provide less or potentially even more
access to schools, for example in displacement camps, and the cost of displacement has
implications for the household’s financial resources. On the supply side, the destruction of
1Focussing on education, the object of study in this investigation, civil war, as well as long-run outcomes
at least 10 years after the end of war, these include Akresh & De Walque (2011); Justino & Verwimp
(2013); La Mattina (2017); Leon (2012); Saing et al. (2017).
2This income channel may be particularly important for very poor households when pushed close to or
below the subsistence level and a substitution between education and income-generating work may
realise. Another involuntary education-labour substitution may arise from child soldiering.
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schools and killings of teachers clearly reduces education supply during and after conflict.
The supply side channels have clear policy implications for post-war reconstruction
work. If addressed, this should reduce the impact that conflict has on educational at-
tainment. In this sense, Sierra Leone is an interesting setting to look at because the
government implemented school construction programmes soon after the war (e.g. the
SABABU education project). I evaluate the impact of the conflict on educational at-
tainment ten years after the end of the war, using both cohort and geographic conflict
variation in the spirit of a difference-in-difference (DID) design. Unlike most of the studies
analysing this link using similar methods in different contexts, I consider not only pri-
mary school education, but also secondary education – and indeed find significant results
for secondary school aged children. To be precise, I consider four potentially affected
cohorts: those born during the war and pre-school, primary school and secondary school
aged students at the onset of war. To deal with potential concerns around the key iden-
tification assumption of parallel trends in education across cohorts between chiefdoms3
that are more or less severely affected by conflict, I perform two robustness checks. First,
I investigate whether parallel trends hold between older cohorts and second, I present
some analysis pertaining to displacement and migration that make strong biasses through
spillover effects less likely. This also presents a contribution to the existing papers, most
of which do not seem to consider potential spillover effects in their setting which may be
very likely in light of non-negligible displacement that conflict typically causes.
I find that a one standard deviation in conflict intensity reduces the educational attain-
ment of pre-school, primary school and secondary school aged children in Sierra Leone
by between 0.3 and 0.5 years. This translates into a reduction in educational attainment
by between one and almost two years of schooling when moving someone from one of the
chiefdoms least affected by conflict to one of the most highly affected chiefdoms. Such a
large effect tends to be rather among the largest effects that other studies find in long-run
studies in different countries. The direction and size of the effect is confirmed in two ad-
ditional pieces of analysis. The first one exploits the conflict measure at the household as
opposed to the chiefdom level. The second one is a siblings comparison. Within chiefdoms
or households, children at school age are essentially compared to their older siblings who
were beyond school age.
The paper then proceeds to investigate two potential channels of the sizeable effect:
3Chiefdoms are the third-level units of administration in Sierra Leone, following districts and the national
level. There are 161 chiefdoms in my data, including the chiefdoms on the Western peninsula where
the capital Freetown lies.
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Displacement and asset loss reflecting reduced material resources of the household. In-
corporating data on these variables in the main analysis does not mediate the conflict
effect significantly and does not even have a significant effect itself. Therefore, it seems
that other demand side factors such as destroyed infrastructure or uncertainty on the way
to school or particularly supply side factors may be a main driving force of how conflict
affects the education of children at school age during the war.
The following section will explore the context of the Sierra Leonean war in some more
detail while section 3 discusses the data used in this study. I explain the identification
strategy and empirical analyses performed in section 4, present the results in section 5
and conclude in section 6.
2. The Civil War in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone suffered a civil war between 1991 and 2002 that caused some 70,000 casu-
alties, displacement of over half the population and left many people injured, maimed
and raped (UNDP, 2006). It started as an insurgency by the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) in 1991 entering the country from Liberia in the south. The RUF was a small
rebel group at the onset of war with the political goal of overthrowing the ruling one-
party regime, led by the All People’s Congress (APC) party under Joseph Saidu Momoh
(Richards, 1996). Their insurgency was supported by the National Patriotic Front for
Liberia (NPFL), involved in the ongoing Liberian civil war. The RUF remained mainly
active in the southern parts of Sierra Leone between 1991 and 1995 and recruited young
people who were discontent with their lack of access to education and opportunities. A
mixture of this low opportunity cost and coercion under threats led to many young people
joining the RUF movement.
The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) were the government’s armed forces that acted as main
opposing belligerent facing the RUF in the beginning of the war. Poor pay and conditions
led to a military coup by a group of officers within the army under Captain Strasser
who became the leader of the newly established military government called National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) in 1992. With a larger and better supplied army,
the RUF was successfully pushed back to the Gola forests at the very border region with
Liberia by the end of 1993. With young fighters trained in bush camps, however, the RUF
launched a series of raids in a new offensive that was characterised by a large degree of
violence against civilians in the form of looting, killing, maiming and raping. As a response
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and out of an increasing distrust of the SLA which increasingly engaged in such violence as
well, many communities organised their own fighting groups (usually based on traditional
hunting groups and embedded in this culture), later collectively known as Civil Defence
Forces (CDF). By 1995, the RUF had managed to make progress westwards heading
towards the capital Freetown. In 1996, elections followed another coup from within the
army and the newly elected President Kabbah started peace talks with the RUF. At the
same time, the CDF started getting centrally co-ordinated and the leader of the Kamajor
group, the largest hunter group, was made Deputy Defence Minister. In late 1996, the
Abidjan Peace Accord was negotiated, but fighting resumed quickly. An ensuing coup in
1997 led to the establishment of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which
invited the RUF to share with them. As a result, the Nigerian armed forces increased their
support in the ECOWAS4 Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), eventually driving the AFRC
from power and reinstating President Kabbah in 1998. RUF/AFRC forces were forced out
of Freetown and – through operations called “Operation Pay Yourself” and “Operation No
Living Thing” – brought violence against civilians to unprecedented extents. Discussions
between the government and RUF were revived in 1999 and resulted in the signing of
the Lome Peace Agreement in July of the same year. A Disarmament, Demobilisation
and Reintegration (DDR) programme was started. However, following abductions of
UN peacekeeping forces and the imprisonment of RUF leaders, violence broke out again.
Following a large deployment of UN peacekeepers and the intervention of UK armed forces,
hostilities eventually became more sporadic and an agreement to reactivate the ceasefire
was signed in Abuja in November 2000. Disarmament and demobilisation continued
throughout 2001 before peace was finally declared on 18 January 2002 (Fithen & Richards,
2005; NPWJ, 2004).
As Richards (1996) argues, the element of political grievances played a great role as a
cause of the civil war. In particular young people felt discontent with a patrimonial system
in which a small group of patrons rules and decides on the allocation of opportunities and
transfers arbitrarily. They felt disenfranchised and robbed of education and opportunities.
The RUF’s ideological roots lied in an idea of egalitarianism which initially helped in
recruiting disenfranchised youth – however, as knowledge of the atrocities committed by
the group spread, recruitment by capture became more necessary and common.
One of the atrocious features of the Sierra Leonean civil war was the extreme degree
of violence against civilians, in particular all the community looting operations as well
4Economic Community of West African States
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as the raping, killing and maiming that characterised the war. These acts of violence
were not only committed by the RUF, but also by the SLA throughout the war, often
by so-called “Sobels” who were soldiers by day and rebels by night, taking on an identity
under which it was more legitimate and less consequential to engage in these activities.
Such opportunistic behaviour and in particular the role switching demonstrates that there
was an element of “greed” to the civil war that also became increasingly prevalent in the
illicit mining of smuggling of diamonds. The diamond wealth resulting from these activites
helped funding the war and provided incentives to prolong it (Keen, 2005; Richards, 2004).
Another interesting feature is the lack of ethnic or religious divisions as a key driver of
war, as Bellows & Miguel (2009) point out. No ethnic group seemed to be disproportion-
ately victimised and there seems to be no evidence that violence against a particular civil
community was more pronounced if the community and the fighting group have largely
differing ethnicities.
3. Data
This study’s main source of data is the Sierra Leonean Integrated Household Survey
(IHS) 2011 which is a general representative individual-level survey. I use questions on
accomplished grades and degrees in school to construct years of schooling as a measure of
education. For control variables, I also take an individual’s sex, sector (urban vs. rural)
as well as the household head’s education, age and sex from this dataset.
Regarding conflict data, the survey contains a section with a number of questions on
the impact of conflict on individuals and households that I make use of. As a main conflict
measure, I follow Bellows & Miguel (2009) in constructing a victimisation index. This
index is the share of “yes” answers to eight binary questions in the survey that cover
how households were affected by the war along the following dimensions: (1) whether
the household lost property or assets, (2) whether the house was burnt, (3) whether
household members were killed, (4) whether relatives were killed, (5) whether household
members lost limbs, (6) whether household members were molested or raped, (7) whether
household members were displaced, (8) whether the war had any other effect on the
household.5 Given that the extreme degree of violence against civilians was a feature of
the Sierra Leonean civil war, a victimisation index seems to be a sensible measure of the
5In fact, Bellows & Miguel (2009) use very similar questions in a survey carried out by the Institutional
Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) to construct their victimisation index in the same
way.
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intensity of conflict.
Lastly, the survey contains some questions on asset loss, displacement, return and
migration that I can employ for an analysis of the mechanisms and robustness checks. In
particular, some of the questions allow me to track whether someone has been displaced
during the war, has returned since then (i.e. within ten years after the end of the war)
and if they ever lived in a different place.
4. Empirical Design
My empirical strategy exploits both geographical conflict variation and birth cohort vari-
ation in the spirit of a difference-in-difference design. Since schooling typically takes place
at a particular age for children, the civil war will almost exclusively only affect the ed-
ucation of those who are young enough to be at school age during the war. Framing
my empirical approach in terms of treatment and control groups, I therefore define four
treatment cohorts: T1. Born during the war – People who were born between 1991 and
2001; T2. Young children at the onset of war – those born between 1986 and 1990; T3.
Primary school aged children at the onset of war – those born between 1979 and 1985;
T4. Secondary school aged children at the onset of war – those born between 1973 and
1978.6 I further define two control groups: C1. 19-25 year olds at the onset of war –
those born between 1966 and 1972; C2. 26-30 year olds at the onset of war – those born
between 1961 and 1966. For most of my empirical analysis, these two cohorts will serve
as a joint control group, representing young people who are just beyond school age when
the civil war breaks out. However, I will make use of the distinct definitions of C1 and
C2 for a placebo analysis in which I treat the former group as a placebo treatment group
and the latter group as a control group to lend support to my identification assumption.
As for the geographical variation of conflict, I use the victimisation index that is defined
at the chiefdom level.
6The oldest people to be considered part of the treatment group, that is, affected in their education by
the civil war are aged 18 at the onset of war. Of course, there were some people who were older and
still underwent schooling when the war broke out. However, this group is first of all small. The share
of tertiary education students in my 2011 data is 2.2% (which is probably larger than the same share
20 years earlier when the war broke out). Out of all the people who report being above the age of 18
and still currently attending school (again, in 2011), a significant number (28%) report being in junior
secondary school (the equivalent of middle school in many countries) which seems too implausible to
be an accurate reflection of their education situation rather than a simple measurement error. This
would leave less than 10% of those attending school who are actually above the age of 18. Secondly,
people in this situation are likely to be about to finish their schooling and not that heavily affected in
their education in the first few years of the war. Thirdly, including the 18-25 year olds at the onset of
war as a treatment group turns out to just make my results for younger cohorts stronger. Therefore,
if anything, my specification of treatment cohorts may result in a lower bound of the actual effect of
civil war on education.
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4.1. Main Specification
Using both conflict variation at the chiefdom level and cohort variation and controlling
for the relevant fixed effects as well as imposing a linear district-level trend, I estimate
the following regression equation:
yrschikt = αk + βt + (γd × t) + δ(cohortc × conflictk) + µXikt + ikt (1)
The outcome variable is years of schooling for individual i in chiefdom k (located in
district d), born in year t (and thus belonging to cohort c). The two relevant fixed effects
are chiefdom fixed effects αk which capture all shocks common to everyone in the same
chiefdom7 and year-of-birth fixed effects βt that contain fixed characteristics common
to all people born in a given year. Beyond these fixed effects, I am imposing a linear
trend in education development across age that is specific to districts, the chiefdoms’
next higher level of administration.8 The vector Xikt contains some potentially relevant
control variables, including an individual’s sex and sector (urban or rural) as well as the
household head’s education, age and sex. The effect of interest is captured by δ which,
I argue, reflects the causal impact of increased conflict hitting a particular cohort on
the cohort’s educational attainment ten years after the war. The essential identification
assumption is that the change in education between school aged children and older cohorts
in chiefdoms experiencing low conflict intensity is a valid counterfactual for what would
have happened to education between the cohorts in high-conflict chiefdoms in the absence
of conflict (conditional on the control variables and beyond a linear trend at the district
level).
Two endogeneity concerns immediately spring to mind when considering the relation-
ship between conflict and education in this setting. First, there is a likely selection of
chiefdoms for violent activity. However, since my setting exploits both cohort and con-
flict variation, controlling for chiefdom fixed effects and a district-level linear trend, such
a selection would need to happen on the cohort trend of education within the affected
chiefdoms and to go beyond a simple district-level linear trend. This seems considerably
less plausible. Instead of only relying on a plausibility assessment, however, I will also
address this point in a placebo analysis. The placebo analysis considers the education
trend between two cohorts that are both beyond school age and verifies that this trend is
7Note in particular that these chiefdom fixed effects would control for diamond mining activity before
the war which may be a relevant factor for the choice of fighting.
8There are 14 districts in Sierra Leone.
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not systematically different for chiefdoms that are more heavily affected by conflict.
A second concern are spillover effects. It is quite plausible to believe that conflict
hitting a particular chiefdom not only affects the educational attainment of young people
in the same chiefdom, but also in other chiefdoms through various channels. The most
prominent channel is arguably displacement. Movement of people in times of conflict
means that the social and economic situation changes in the destinations which poses a
violation of the assumption that low-conflict chiefdoms are unaffected by conflict beyond
their own (low-intensity) experience of conflict.9 I will deal with this type of concern in
robustness checks exploiting data on migration and displacement.
4.2. Additional Analyses
Further to these robustness checks, I run two additional specifications in order to provide
some credibility for the results I find. The first one is an analysis in which I employ
household-level measures of conflict instead of chiefdom-level averages. For this specifica-
tion, the victimisation index is defined at the household level in the following regression:
yrschikt = αk + βt + (γd × t) + λconflicth + δ(cohortc × conflicth) + µXikt + uikt (2)
This regression contains two modifications relative to the main specification. The vic-
timisation index is defined at the household level h and included in the regression as
a level effect conflicth and in the interaction term (cohortc × conflicth). The remain-
ing variables are the same as above. Essentially, this means that instead of comparing
individuals across chiefdoms that are differently affected by conflict, we now compare in-
dividuals across households with different experiences of conflict. While this specification
delivers similar results to the main specification, spillover effects are likely to be much
more pronounced here. Any spillover across households within the same chiefdom puts
the causal identification of this specification at risk. Such spillovers are considerably more
likely than cross-chiefdom spillovers that would pose a problem for the main specifica-
tion. Therefore, this analysis shall serve as supplemental evidence only with the main
specification remaining the preferred one.
The second additional piece of analysis I perform to identify the effect of interest is a
siblings comparison. Within families, I identify sets of siblings in the data where at least
9In Rubin’s causal framework, this would be a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA).
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one of them was at school age (below the age of 18), at least one of them was beyond
school age and who are no more than ten years apart from each other in age. For these
siblings, I run the following regressions:
yrschikt = αh/k + βt + δSchoolAgeikt + µXikt + vikt (3)
The treatment effect in this regression is the variable SchoolAgeikt indicating whether the
person was at school age during the war. I run two different versions of this, a within-
household comparison (with household fixed effects αh) and a within-chiefdom comparison
(with chiefdom fixed effects αk). The remaining variables are the same as above. While
such a comparison may get rid of some selection problems by the comparisons of siblings
within the same families who happened to be of different ages during the war, the main
issue with this specification is a power issue. The number of siblings with the desired
age variation within families in my data is only 276 which is a small sample size relative
to the number of chiefdom or household fixed effects included in the regression. Again,
this is a reason why this analysis shall only serve as supplemental evidence to the main
specification.
Apart from these two additional specifications, I also provide some suggestive evidence
of mechanisms of conflict. In particular, data on whether households were displaced dur-
ing the war and on the extent of asset loss they experienced allows me to verify whether
these factors are drivers of the effect of conflict on education. Asset loss is reflective of a
reduction of material resources of households which should affect their demand for educa-
tion. Displacement is another channel through which conflict may affect the accumulation
of schooling. I test for these potential channels by including the respective variables and
their interactions with conflict in the main specification:
yrschikt = αk + βt + (γd × t) + δ(cohortc × conflictk)
+ζddisplch + θd(cohortc × displch) + µXikt + wikt (4)
yrschikt = αk + βt + (γd × t) + δ(cohortc × conflictk)
+ζaassetsh + θa(cohortc × assetsh) + µXikt + zikt (5)
The added term displch is an indicator whether the household h (of individual i) was
displaced during the war and the variable assetsh is the number of item categories in
which the household lost assets.
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5. Results
5.1. Main Results
5.1.1. Main Specification
Table 1 demonstrates the results of the above regression equation with and without con-
trols X. As a base case, the interaction term for the control cohorts (those born between
1961 and 1972) are left out – the four interaction terms for the four treatment cohorts
are reported. The coefficients capture the loss in schooling that someone at school age
experiences who lives in a chiefdom that was more affected by the conflict relative to
someone else in the same cohort living in a chiefdom less affected by conflict. As can be
soon, both the uncontrolled and controlled regression demonstrate a similar and sizeable
effect of the war on the education of children at pre-school, primary school and secondary
school age. In particular, for these three cohorts, a standard deviation increase in the
intensity of conflict leads to a reduction in schooling attained by between 0.3 and 0.5
years. Focussing on primary school aged children as an example, moving a child from
a chiefdom with one of the lowest intensities of conflict to a chiefdom at the top end of
conflict intensity (consider, for example, the bottom and top 10% which are 3.28 stan-
dard deviations apart from each other) reduces their education by more than 1.5 years of
schooling. This can certainly be considered a very sizeable effect and ranges among the
largest effects in comparable studies.
5.1.2. Further Specifications
A first additional specification that I run is a household-level analysis. The results for
this specification (equation 2) are provided in Table 2. Since the conflict variable is a
victimisation index, taking values between 0 and 1, the coefficients are to be interpreted
as the loss of schooling of a child at school age in a household with the strongest possible
victimisation experience relative to living in a household that is not affected by the conflict
at all. Indeed, all coefficients are negative and of great magnitude for pre-school, primary
school and secondary school aged children. In particular the result for primary school
aged children strongly confirms the main specification as the only significant result and
with a very similar effect size.10 The other results are indeed large as well, but very
10Recall that results in Table 5.1 are reported in standard errors which translates into a loss of schooling
by 1.6 years if moving a child from one of the lowest conflict-intensity to one of the highest-conflict
intensity chiefdoms.
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imprecisely estimated and indeed insignificant. However, this specification is likely to
suffer from spillover effects since households are compared. A household’s victimisation
is likely to have an impact on neighbouring households within the same community. The
results should therefore be considered with caution and shall serve as confirming evidence
to the more robust main specification at the chiefdom level. It is nevertheless reassuring
to see the same direction of the effect and similar magnitudes.
In a similar way, a siblings comparison as a second additional piece of evidence confirms
the main results in direction and magnitude. Table 3 reports the result of regression 3
where the attained level of schooling of children at school age during the war is compared
to the education of their older siblings who were beyond school age during the war already.
Specification (1) and (2) provide a within-chiefdom comparison of all sets of siblings where
at least one was at school age and one beyond it at the onset of war and the age difference
between siblings is not greater than ten years. Specification (3) and (4) provide the
same analysis within households. The results to (2) and (4), the controlled regressions,
are indeed quite similar and indicate that school aged children lost a year of education
relative to their older siblings. Indeed, the results are insignificant, but the small sample
size relative to the number of included fixed effects for chiefdoms or households has severe
power implications driving large standard errors. Supplementing the main specification,
however, these results again provide suggestive confirmation of large negative effects that
the war had on the education of school aged children.
5.2. Robustness
5.2.1. Placebo Study
In order to lend support to the identification assumption of the main specification, I carry
out a placebo analysis in which I compare the two control cohorts in their educational
attainment which should both have been unaffected by the war since they were both
beyond school age. This verifies that the trend in educational attainment across cohorts
is the same (conditional on the controls and beyond a district-level linear trend) for people
beyond school age and supports the idea that it would have continued to be the same
for younger, school aged people in the absence of the war. To carry out this analysis, I
run the regression equation (1) above again, restricting myself only to the control group
(those born between 1961 and 1972) and allowing the younger control cohort (C1) to have
a placebo treatment effect which is captured in the reported interaction term. Table 4
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shows the result. There is no statistically significant differential effect of conflict on the
educational attainment of cohort (C1) relative to the base cohort (C2); the coefficient
estimate is indeed even very close to zero for the second specification including the same
control variables as main regression.
5.2.2. Spillover Effects
There are a number of ways in which low-conflict chiefdoms are affected by the civil
war beyond their own direct experience of conflict – such effects arise from the fact that
high conflict in some chiefdoms impacts on outcomes in low-conflict chiefdoms as well,
in particular through temporary or permanent movement of people. For identification
purposes, this may pose contamination problems, that is, the education outcome in low-
conflict chiefdoms would no longer be an accurate reflection of what would have happened
in chiefdoms with higher conflict intensity had they experienced less conflict (causal effect),
but also captures the impact of conflict realisations in other (e.g. surrounding) areas on
them (spillover effect). This section discusses different ways in which such spillover effects
may occur and addresses these issues using data on migration and displacement from the
household survey.11
A first spillover concern is that people who are more likely to be displaced from chief-
doms that are more heavily affected by the conflict and choose to stay in a different
(low-conflict) chiefdom would be reported in the “false” chiefdom in 2011. If the influence
of these people is large enough and their education outcomes systematically different from
those who did not stay anywhere else, this may introduce bias. To provide some evidence
against this possibility, note first that the share non-returnees is relatively low, at 7%.12
Furthermore, restricting our sample to either only non-displaced people or only those who
returned and re-running the main regression does not alter the results significantly. Table
5 shows the results. The coefficient on the interaction terms is not significantly different
for any cohort in the two alternative specifications leaving out displaced or those who did
not return.
11In particular, the answers to two yes-no questions are used, namely whether (i) someone was displaced
as a result of the war and (ii) someone has returned from displacement since the end of the war.
12Note that the share of non-returnees is based on the household survey in Sierra Leone and can therefore
by definition only capture internally displaced persons who did not return, but not refugees who fled
abroad and chose not to return. There is not a lot of data on the number of refugees who returned to
Sierra Leone over the years after the war, but two sources indicate that almost half a million refugees
fled to the neighbouring countries Guinea and Liberia during the war that took the great majority of
refugees. By 2004, 272,000 seem to have returned to Sierra Leone already and the number of Sierra
Leonean refugees recorded by UNHCR was below 10,000 in 2009 (UNHCR, 2009; UNU-MERIT, 2017).
Relative to the population of Sierra Leone, therefore, the share of refugees who fled abroad and have
not returned by 2011 seems to be negligibly small.
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Differential displacement intensity across chiefdoms that experience varying levels of
conflict intensity may be another spillover concern. It can indeed be observed that con-
flict is unsurprisingly positively correlated with displacement rates at the chiefdom level.
It is unclear, however, whether this is a positive or negative spillover that high-conflict
chiefdoms impose on low-conflict chiefdoms. Several channels are theoretically conceiv-
able. A net inflow of school aged children may mean local crowding-out effects, that is, the
educational attainment of children in low-conflict chiefdoms is negatively affected through
the spillover. However, a net inflow of older people who are pursuing their activities, in-
cluding those in the education sector (e.g. teachers), may increase the education outcomes
of children in low-conflict chiefdoms. What the net effect of these different channels is
remains unclear. To provide some suggestive evidence that the net effect may actually
be close to zero, I regress the displacement dummy on the conflict measure, cohort fixed
effects and interaction terms between conflict and cohorts:
displikt = conflictk + cohortc + γ(cohortc × conflictk) + ξikt (6)
The idea is to gauge whether the net inflow rate of young people at school age (in treat-
ment cohorts) is different from the net inflow rate of older people (in control cohorts).
Table 6 shows the results. While the level effects capture that people are more likely
to be displaced from chiefdoms experiencing more conflict and slightly less likely to be
displaced at younger age (in treatment cohorts), the interaction terms are all fairly precise
zero estimates. This means that the difference in the displacement rate across conflict
intensities does not vary based on whether people are at school age or older, i.e. the net
inflow rates for low-conflict chiefdoms are the same for varying age groups. Of course,
this is no proof that opposing effects exactly cancel each other off, but it seems to suggest
that there might not be very strong spillover effects in one direction or the other.
5.3. Evidence on Mechanisms
For a large reduced form effect, it is interesting and relevant for post-war policy making
through what channel conflict affects education. The policy implications are naturally
very different if the effect is mainly coming from demand side factors or supply side
factors. Using data on displacement and asset loss that households experience, this section
considers two particular channels. The first one is displacement. Including a variable
indicating household displacement and its interaction with the cohort dummies in the
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main regression allows us to see whether displacement mediates some of the conflict affects
and has implications for the education of school aged children itself. Just like for the main
conflict effect, the interaction term tells us to what extent the development of attained
schooling between older cohorts and the given cohorts is different for displaced people
relative to those who were not displaced. Table 7 shows the results in specification (2)
(for this regression 4) in comparison with the main results reproduced in specification
(1). As can clearly be seen, including the displacement terms does not change any of the
original conflict effects significantly and displacement in and of itself does not seem to
have an effect on the education of school aged children. It is noteworthy, however, that
the coefficients are quite imprecisely estimated and positive for children younger than
primary school age at the onset of war. The insignificant results may well mask some
heterogeneity with some displaced people having no access to schools in their destinations
and in particular very young children potentially gaining access to schools in displacement
camps as they become old enough to go to school during the long war. These are of
course speculations, but they serve as a word of caution to overhastily interpreting this as
displacement having no implications for education.13 In any case, it is clear that conflict
still affects education in a major way other than through displacement.
Another channel that we can test for is a demand-side channel. Using the number of
item categories in which household lost assets as additional element in the main regression
in the same way as before, we can verify to what extent asset loss accounts for a reduction
in attained schooling. Table 8 shows the results in specification (2) (for this regression
5) in comparison with the main results reproduced in specification (1). Similarly to the
results for displacement, the conflict effects are not significantly changed, neither are any
of the asset loss coefficients significant in and of itself. A caveat that should be kept
in mind, however, is that the measure may only inaccurately and partly measure how
conflict affects the financial resources of the household.
Taking these results together, it seems that other demand side factors such as infras-
tructure destruction or increased uncertainty on the way to school or particularly supply
side factors such as the destruction of schools or killings of teachers play a large role in
determining how conflict affects the educational attainment of children at school age dur-
ing the war. This is in line with the evidence that Leon (2012) finds in Peru. Against this
finding, the roll-out of post-war education projects in Sierra Leone targeting the supply
13Indeed, other studies focussing on this effect do not find conclusive evidence. See, for example, Fransen
et al. (2018) and Fiala (2015).
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side has likely been a good policy response. To what extent these policies have been
successful (and in their absence the found conflict effects would have been even larger)
remains unobserved in this study. However, the analysis does reveal that in spite of such
approaches, the educational loss for school aged children during the war remains large,
even ten years after the end of the war.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the long-run impact of the Sierra Leonean civil war on the
education of young people at school age during the conflict. In the spirit of a DID design,
I exploit cohort and geographic conflict intensity variation to analyse this question. I find
that pre-school, primary school and secondary school aged children suffer an educational
loss of between 0.3 and 0.5 years of schooling per one standard deviation increase in
conflict intensity. This means that children at that age who live in chiefdoms that were
most heavily affected by conflict lose between one and almost two years of schooling
relative to children of the same age living in chiefdoms that were least affected by the
civil war. The result is robust to several robustness checks that lend support to the
identification strategy and can be found in similar direction and extent in supplementary
analyses.
Some evidence on channels suggests that displacement and asset loss on the demand
side may not be major ways in which conflict affects educational outcomes. This lack
of evidence suggests that how the supply of schools and teachers is affected by the war
may be a very important force of how conflict affects education. The policy efforts for
post-war reconstruction work in terms of education should therefore focus on supply side
factors. The large effect found provide a solid justification for such policy efforts and
further evidence that there may be long-run effects of conflict on life outcomes of those
involved in light of the fact that education typically affects earnings and living standards.
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Appendix
A. Tables
Table 1: Main Results
(1) (2)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
born 91-01 × conflict 0.020 -0.015
(0.126) (0.128)
born 86-90 × conflict -0.425∗∗ -0.424∗∗
(0.209) (0.209)
born 79-85 × conflict -0.596∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.165)
born 73-78 × conflict -0.307∗∗ -0.279∗∗
(0.132) (0.123)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 5.6 (born 61-72, conflict = 0)
Controls X
N 23983 23890
R2 0.337 0.459
Note: All specifications include chiefdom and year-of-birth fixed effects and a
district-level linear trend. Control variables in (2) are sex and sector (urban or
rural) as well as the household head’s education, age and sex. Standard errors
are clustered at the chiefdom level and reported in brackets. The conflict
measure is standardised. Avg. Yrs. of sch. provides the average educational
attainment for people in the control group in 2011 who live in chiefdoms that
experience a mean level of conflict. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Household Level Results
(1) (2)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
born 91-01 × conflict -0.087 -0.140
(0.369) (0.357)
born 86-90 × conflict -0.614 -0.698
(0.565) (0.573)
born 79-85 × conflict -1.682∗∗∗ -1.489∗∗∗
(0.518) (0.479)
born 73-78 × conflict -0.371 -0.427
(0.413) (0.394)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 5.6 (born 61-72, conflict = 0)
Controls X
N 23983 23890
R2 0.335 0.458
Note: All specifications include chiefdom and year-of-birth fixed effects and a
district-level linear trend. Control variables in (2) are sex and sector (urban or
rural) as well as the household head’s education, age and sex. Standard errors
are clustered at the chiefdom level and reported in brackets. The conflict
measure is standardised. Avg. Yrs. of sch. provides the average educational
attainment for people in the control group in 2011 who live in chiefdoms that
experience a mean level of conflict. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3: Siblings Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yrs. of Sch. Yrs. of Sch. Yrs. of Sch. Yrs. of Sch.
School age -1.451 -1.086 -0.990 -0.965
(0.994) (0.831) (0.853) (0.852)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 3.7 (siblings beyond school age during the war)
FE Level Chiefdom Chiefdom Household Household
Controls X X
N 276 276 276 276
R2 0.594 0.735 0.846 0.848
Note: The reported regressor school age is a dummy indicating whether below the age of
18 during the war. All specifications include year of birth as a control variable. Additional
control variables in (2) and (4) are sex and sector (urban or rural) as well as the household
head’s education, age and sex. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Avg. Yrs. of sch.
provides the average educational attainment for people in the control group in 2011, i.e.
those beyond school age who have siblings at school age. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Placebo Results
(1) (2)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
born 66-72 × conflict 0.248 0.066
(0.133) (0.601)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 5.5 (born 61-65, conflict = 0)
Controls X
N 4121 4107
R2 0.286 0.615
Note: All specifications include chiefdom and year-of-birth fixed effects and a
district-level linear trend. Control variables in (2) are sex and sector (urban
or rural) as well as the household head’s education, age and sex. Standard
errors are clustered at the chiefdom level and reported in brackets. The
conflict measure is standardised. Avg. Yrs. of sch. provides the average
educational attainment for people in control group (C2) in 2011 who live
in chiefdoms that experience a mean level of conflict. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5: Subsample Results
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
born 91-01 × conflict -0.015 -0.093 -0.054
(0.128) (0.131) (0.127)
born 86-90 × conflict -0.424∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗
(0.209) (0.216) (0.204)
born 79-85 × conflict -0.508∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.157) (0.166)
born 73-78 × conflict -0.279∗∗ -0.340∗∗ -0.271∗∗
(0.123) (0.141) (0.126)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 5.6 6.2 5.6
Sample Full No Displaced Only Returned
Controls X X X
N 23890 14667 22869
R2 0.459 0.491 0.464
Note: All specifications include chiefdom and year-of-birth fixed effects and a district-level linear
trend. Control variables are sex and sector (urban or rural) as well as the household head’s education,
age and sex. Standard errors are clustered at the chiefdom level and reported in brackets. The conflict
measure is standardised. Avg. Yrs. of sch. provides the average educational attainment for people in
the control group in 2011 who live in chiefdoms that experience a mean level of conflict. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Displacement Intensity
(1)
Displacement
conflict 1.286∗∗∗ (0.084)
born 91-01 0.002 (0.008)
born 86-90 -0.024∗ (0.012)
born 79-85 -0.027∗∗ (0.012)
born 73-78 -0.019 (0.012)
born 91-01 × conflict 0.001 (0.007)
born 86-90 × conflict -0.017 (0.010)
born 79-85 × conflict -0.006 (0.010)
born 73-78 × conflict -0.004 (0.009)
Constant -0.032 (0.027)
N 28445
R2 0.168
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the chief-
dom level and reported in brackets. The conflict
measure is standardised. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Displacement Channel
(1) (2)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
born 91-01 × conflict -0.015 -0.038
(0.128) (0.131)
born 86-90 × conflict -0.424∗∗ -0.469∗∗
(0.209) (0.210)
born 79-85 × conflict -0.508∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.168)
born 73-78 × conflict -0.279∗∗ -0.277∗∗
(0.123) (0.127)
born 91-01 × displacement 0.138
(0.166)
born 86-90 × displacement 0.268
(0.203)
born 79-85 × displacement -0.110
(0.157)
born 73-78 × displacement 0.001
(0.182)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 5.6 (born 61-72, conflict = 0)
Controls X X
N 23890 23890
R2 0.459 0.459
Note: All specifications include chiefdom and year-of-birth fixed effects and a
district-level linear trend. Additional control variables are sex and sector (urban
or rural) as well as the household head’s education, age and sex. Standard errors
are clustered at the chiefdom level and reported in brackets. The conflict measure
is standardised. Avg. Yrs. of sch. provides the average educational attainment for
people in the control group in 2011 who live in chiefdoms that experience a mean
level of conflict. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 8: Assets Channel
(1) (2)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
born 91-01 × conflict -0.015 0.025
(0.128) (0.161)
born 86-90 × conflict -0.424∗∗ -0.527∗∗
(0.209) (0.253)
born 79-85 × conflict -0.508∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.210)
born 73-78 × conflict -0.279∗∗ -0.354∗∗
(0.123) (0.146)
born 91-01 × asset loss -0.029
(0.049)
born 86-90 × asset loss 0.086
(0.060)
born 79-85 × asset loss 0.033
(0.054)
born 73-78 × asset loss 0.061
(0.040)
Avg. Yrs. of sch. 5.6 (born 61-72, conflict = 0)
Controls X X
N 23890 23890
R2 0.459 0.459
Note: All specifications include chiefdom and year-of-birth fixed effects and a
district-level linear trend. Additional control variables are sex and sector (urban
or rural) as well as the household head’s education, age and sex. Standard
errors are clustered at the chiefdom level and reported in brackets. The conflict
measure is standardised. Avg. Yrs. of sch. provides the average educational
attainment for people in the control group in 2011 who live in chiefdoms that
experience a mean level of conflict. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
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